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Kenneth Mann's Defending White Collar Crime" treats an aspect of
law practice that every lawyer knows about, but many may fear to ques-
tion-the concealing and distorting of facts so that a client avoids his just
deserts under the law. This important book puts this issue in the complex
context of actual practice, where such misconduct cannot be clearly distin-
guished, empirically or morally, from lawful tactics of the advocate. Any-
one who has supposed that the solution to this problem is easy will have
to think again in the light of Dr. Mann's fascinating study.
Dr. Kenneth Mann is a sociologist and a lawyer. As a sociologist he is
trained in observation of human group behavior; as a lawyer he is trained
in law and in the legal ethics of the adversary system of trial. His study
addresses how lawyers represent persons accused of white-collar crime, a
task which often involves severe moral conflict. Dr. Mann's findings sug-
gest that, in general, lawyers do an honorable job, but that in marginal
situations they sometimes resort to deception-sometimes of others, some-
times of themselves.
Defending White Collar Crime reveals that Dr. Mann is not only tech-
nically well-equipped for his study, but that he is a fair and generally
sympathetic reporter. Indeed, in reporting his findings, Dr. Mann seems
barely to intrude as author. The events that he reports are largely ver-
bal-things said and pointedly left unsaid; for the work of the lawyer
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consists essentially of fashioning words and phrases. It is these words and
phrases that Dr. Mann reports, supplementing them only with his own
spare and matter-of-fact descriptions of context. The verbal facts literally
speak for themselves.
The relevant ethical rules are that a lawyer must be loyal to a client
within the bounds of the law,2 and, as a corollary, that a lawyer must
keep in confidence information about the client, again within the bounds
of the law.' The lawyers studied were all New York City practitioners,
most of whom were either solo practitioners or members of firms of the
size in which most American lawyers practice, i.e., firms having not more
than 20 lawyers.4 Allowing for the fact that all the lawyers were from the
New York region, I surmise that they are fairly typical in such standard
demographics as education, age, and ethnic identity, although these vital
statistics are not given, possibly to help prevent disclosure of the lawyers'
identities. Interestingly, as compared with the bar generally, a dispropor-
tionate number attended elite law schools. Also, as a whole they were
relatively young, reflecting the fact that trial work requires the stamina of
relative youth. My inference is that none of the lawyers were women or
Blacks and that most of them were either Jewish or Catholic, which may
or may not be relevant.5 In any event, the focal point of this study is not
who these defense lawyers are, but what they do.
The distinctive characteristic of the lawyers studied is that they were all
specialists in criminal defense practice, specifically in defense of white col-
lar crimes. Most of them had been assistant prosecutors at an earlier stage
in their professional careers, a credential that is typical of private practi-
tioners who specialize in criminal defense work. Unlike the clients of most
criminal defense lawyers, however, the clients represented by these law-
yers were from the middle class. A correlate of this fact is that the clients
had at least modest financial resources, so their lawyers usually had the
means as well as the direct incentives to do the best possible job. The
offenses involved are classic white-collar crimes: tax fraud, securities
fraud, bribery. These crimes are committed not by means of physical force
or threat of violence, but by dishonest statements and documents. The ac-
cused is not an underclass hooligan or thief, but a nice family man. (Like
the lawyers, the clients studied all appear to have been men.)
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1981).
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C); DR 7-102(B) (1981).
4. See CURRAN, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 14 (1985) (73.9% of American lawyers in
private practice are in firms having fewer than 21 lawyers).
5. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (1982).
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I. DEFENDING THE GUILTY
In all likelihood, the client in each instance in fact committed the crime
under investigation, or some offense close to it. In this respect, white collar
crime defendants are similar to other criminal defendants, almost all of
whom also have in fact committed something close to the offense charged.
The supposition that a criminal accused is likely to be guilty in fact is not
an a priori antilibertarian prejudice or a preoccupation with statistical
evidence. It is an a postiori consequence of the process by which people
are chosen for prosecution. The authorities generally do not wish to prose-
cute people who are not guilty, or to waste their time on cases that cannot
be proved in court if necessary. Hence, the cases that reach the defense
lawyers are primarily the product of a rational winnowing process that
seeks to identify only those whose guilt can probably be established be-
yond a reasonable doubt. There should be no caviling over this premise.
The clients of criminal defense lawyers are (almost always) guilty of
something serious. Criminal defense lawyers themselves do not dispute the
proposition, except when speaking in public or for attribution.
But any given client's guilt is a matter only of high probability, not
certainty. In the process by which cases are selected for prosecution, the
prosecutorial process suffers mistakes, failures, and perversions. Even
well-oiled bureaucratic machines break down sometimes, and criminal in-
vestigation and prosecution by its nature is not a simple mechanical pro-
cess. Hence, it is possible to say with assurance only that "almost all" of
the clients are guilty.
It follows that an indeterminate few of the clients are not guilty. The
judicial process lacks the perspective of an omniscient observer, so that it
cannot tell which ones constitute these few. Indeed, the judicial process is
denied much of the knowledge available to the investigating authorities, to
the accused, and to the lawyer representing the accused. The law does not
permit the court the leap of inference that would be virtually conclusive
from a layman's viewpoint. Who else but a crook makes large business
payments in cash? Who else but a crook would consign the accounting of
important transactions to himself or to a single bookkeeper? Who else but
a crook would be totally unforthcoming with the authorities when ques-
tioned about questionable transactions? Under our law the court is not
even allowed to presume that only dishonest businessmen conduct business
in an unbusiness-like way. On the contrary, prosecution under our law
must be predicated on the squinted picture of reality that will be
presented to the court under the rules of evidence. In the eyes of science,
common sense, social morality, and public policy, only an accidental few
among this clientele are innocent in the matters of which they are suspect.
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In the eyes of the law they are, nevertheless, all innocent until proven
guilty or pleaded guilty.
As Dr. Mann demonstrates, defense of white collar crime involves a
somewhat different game from that of defending "ordinary" crime, i.e.,
crimes such as homicide, assault, rape, robbery, and burglary. Dr. Mann
concisely and accurately describes the differences between the defense law-
yer's situation in white-collar crime and in "ordinary" crime. An "ordi-
nary" crime typically involves a bodily act that occurs suddenly in the
presence of the victim-on the street, in a bar, within the family. There is
overt evidence of the crime's commission and an immediate "fight or
flight" reaction by the victim or bystanders, who may call the police, who
in turn try to respond quickly in order to gather the evidence while it is
fresh. The transaction is usually compact in time, space, and action, and
has barely ended when the police arrive. If there ever will be sufficient
evidence to convict, that evidence exists at the scene when the police ar-
rive, in the victim's condition and in the testimony of the victim and by-
standers.' Only later will defense counsel be brought in. If the police have
done their job, the prosecutor will from the start have a pretty good hand
to play. On the other side, the game to be played by defense counsel in the
ordinary crime involves picking up a hand in which most of the cards are
already face up.
The typical situation of defense counsel in white-collar crime is quite
different, Dr. Mann explains. 7 White-collar crimes are frauds whose very
design seeks to leave no traces. The existence of the crime can be estab-
lished only by a prosecutorial investigation that puts together bits and
pieces of evidence that are hidden, dispersed or seemingly innocuous. Doc-
uments typically have to be ferreted out from diverse places, many of them
private files whose contents or existence the investigators can only
surmise. Witnesses-the bookkeeper, the secretary, the deliveryman, the
office manager-often know only fragments of the story. Their willing-
ness to cooperate with the investigation is often ambivalent at best, owing
to the fact that they themselves are suspect, or that they are friends, rela-
tives or employees of the prime suspect. In this game, the prosecutor is not
dealt the hand of events familiar to the police in "ordinary" crimes. In-
stead, the prosecution, or other investigating authority such as the Internal
Revenue Service, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the State
Tax Commission, must gropingly assemble its case. The investigating au-
6. This is usually not true of burglary or of "victimless crimes" such as dealing in narcotics. As
far as the detection process is concerned, these offenses resemble white-collar crime rather than violent
offenses such as assault or purse-snatching. That is, they usually are uncovered only by working up a
file through persistent investigation.
7. Pp. 9-13.
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thority tries to conceal its gropings, but sooner or later the search gives off
signals, and the prospective client begins to suspect that he is a suspect.
Then-for him the earlier the better-the prudent suspect will consult
counsel.
At this stage, when the prosecutor's investigation is still going on, the
defense lawyer's game is information control-a game with various and
conflicting goals. As Dr. Mann says, "[tihe first goal is to obtain adequate
information about the situation being investigated."' Pursuit of this goal is
legally and morally legitimate, indeed obligatory in the "zealous represen-
tation" of the client. Lawyers' work in pursuing this goal is shrouded in
secrecy. The raison d'etre of the attorney-client privilege is to facilitate the
lawyer's covert pursuit of relevant information, with the goal of finding
legally exculpating or mitigating evidence.' This aspect of the criminal
defense lawyer's work is lawful and honorable, and indeed indispensable
to the rule of law. If prosecution cannot be defeated by the defense law-
yer's work, by what mechanism could it be defeated? And prosecutions
must be defeated sometimes, otherwise they become infallible.
II. INNOCENT IGNORANCE
The morality of a seriously moral person includes concern for the truth
of the matter in things of consequence. The advocate, however, must be
concerned with presentation to others of evidence that will be taken as the
equivalent of truth. Every trial advocate who is a seriously moral person
has to be concerned with this ambiguity.
As Dr. Mann says: "The second goal, which can exist only in conjunc-
tion with the first, is to keep the client from communicating too much
information to the attorney, information that would interfere with his
building a strong defense."1 ° Lawyers do not commonly acknowledge that
they do not wish always to gather all relevant information concerning a
client's matter.1 To acknowledge that avoiding certain information may
be a goal in the attorney-client relationship contradicts the premises of the
adversary system and the conventional theory of the attorney-client privi-
8. P. 103.
9. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
10. P. 103.
11. The most concisely explicated recognition of the "need not to know" is by Richard
"Racehorse" Haynes, the highly successful Texas trial lawyer. Speaking at a continuing legal educa-
tion program for criminal defense lawyers, Mr. Haynes said:
"I never ask the client what it is that he contends are the facts from his point of view in the
initial interview". . .in order to avoid being "compromised" in deciding whether to put him on
the witness stand. The thing to do is to ask him "what he suspects the other side might claim."
A lawyer who puts on the stand a client or witness he knows will lie under oath might get
himself into trouble, and Mr. Haynes was apparently suggesting that it is better not to know.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1981, at 16, col. 5.
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lege. Whoever heard of the attorney-client privilege being justified on the
ground that it allows the lawyer merely to gather some information about
the client? Dr. Mann describes the deeper reason why the lawyer may
want to avoid certain information:
Some attorneys, for instance, discourage the disclosure of facts that
would negate a defense of lack of knowledge. They would not want
to find out that a client actually had knowledge of a fact that would
prove criminal intent. . . . The attorney can then more forcefully
argue that the client did not know of the report or action. . . . The
deeper moral dilemma . . . is the question of what it means to
devote oneself to defending persons who commit white-collar crimes
",12
The lawyer's avoidance of clearly incriminating evidence provides him
with an answer to the lay person's classic question-How can you defend
a guilty person? Part of the answer turns out to be: "As a general practice
I make sure that I don't really know whether the client is guilty."
Dr. Mann suggests that many defense counsel are people often morally
troubled in their vocation, who seek refuge from torturing knowledge in
the soothing folds of cognitive dissonance. This assessment corresponds to
my own observation. The retreat from awareness and the moral responsi-
bility that goes with it may merit the scorn often heaped upon lawyers.
But what are the alternatives in the real and imperfect world? To have
defense counsel so cognitively obtuse that they cannot recognize guilt-
proving evidence when they see it? To have defense counsel so morally
obtuse that they are not troubled by their work, and need no refuge? To
build a system around the appointment of amateurs who are innocent of
what they are doing because they do not know what they are doing? To
abolish the right to counsel in any criminal case where the prosecution has
evidence that any sensible person would recognize as convincing?
A moralist who indulges in damning the vocation of the criminal de-
fense lawyer, but who pretends to be seriously concerned with the prob-
lem at issue, has an obligation to address these necessarily entailed issues.
Dr. Mann, manifesting the seriousness of his own moral concern, displays
both understanding of the dilemma and sympathy for the lawyers who
confront it.
This may be about the most that can be said concerning the moral is-
sues posed by a defense lawyer's knowledge of his client's guilt. To do his
job, the lawyer needs knowledge of facts that fairly indicate his client is
guilty. Yet, for the lawyer to have knowledge of such facts in their full
12. Pp. 103-04.
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implication is often unbearable, especially in any situation where satisfac-
torily doing the job at hand does not require that the lawyer have that
knowledge. Hence, the lawyer avoids knowing the facts in their full impli-
cation except when it is unavoidably necessary. That comforting ignorance
allows the lawyer better to play his role-"to forcefully argue that the
client did not know." It also allows the client to believe that the lawyer
does not know of his guilt. That belief in turn gives the client confidence
that the lawyer will be able effectively to play the role of advocate. Why
should a client, any more than any other lay person, suppose that a law-
yer could effectively defend someone the lawyer knows to be guilty? The
lawyer's cognitive dissonance thus serves to strengthen the lawyer-client
relationship in both directions.
At this point, of course, serious moralists often protest that the whole
criminal justice process is a charade. In some part of his mind, the client
knows whether or not he is guilty-at least if he himself is not in a deep
state of cognitive dissonance (as clients often are concerning their crimes
and misdemeanors). In some part of the lawyer's mind-the part he
would use, for example, in selecting a guardian for his own children-he
also knows that the client is guilty. The prosecutor knows the client is
guilty, for she would not want to waste the taxpayer's money and her own
time on a weak case. The judge knows that most of those who are accused
are guilty, and has no reason to think that this particular case is
exceptional.
But the law as a system does not possess any of this knowledge. The
law in a constitutional regime treats the accused as guilty only when guilt
is made out beyond a reasonable doubt by lawful evidence adduced by
lawful procedure. The law in such a regime limits itself to working on the
basis of public knowledge of a special kind-a species of "official knowl-
edge"-and cannot resort to the private knowledge of the prosecutor, the
defense lawyer, or anyone else. The law proceeds on what is made to
appear according to the rules of the game, not on what "really is." Com-
pared with the process by which we apprehend reality in ordinary life, the
law's procedure of cognition is literally a "charade": a guessing game in
which each syllable of a word to be found 'guilty' is "represented in rid-
dling verse or by picture, tableau or dramatic action."13 Using "dramatic
action" to determine the matter "to be found" is the essence of due
process.
The defense lawyer's avoidance of knowledge that incriminates his cli-
ent provides an escape from the contradiction between the cognitive and
normative reality of personal knowledge, and the cognitive and normative
13. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 227 (9th ed. 1983).
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tableaus that the law uses as the basis for adjudication. Whatever moral
sins the criminal defense lawyer may commit in living this contradiction,
they are committed for the sake of due process and therefore for the sake
of all of us.
III. GUILTY KNOWLEDGE
The same cannot be said of another goal that criminal defense lawyers
sometimes pursue. In any given case, the criminal defense lawyer would
very much prefer that the prosecutor not obtain certain relevant docu-
ments and testimony from the client or any other source, that is, docu-
ments that incriminate and testimony that is adverse. Criminal defense
counsel in "ordinary" crimes may hope that opportunities for loss of such
evidence will eventuate, but the prosecution's case has usually been made
before the defense lawyer becomes involved. For lawyers who defend
white-collar crimes, however, opportunities often exist by which to facili-
tate the suppression of incriminating evidence.
These opportunities are familiar in the lore of advocacy. One is to sug-
gest to the client or to a witness what his testimony might be. Dr. Mann's
study includes no observed instances of a lawyer telling a client or witness
what his testimony should be. The absence of any direct evidence of such
subordnation is explicable for both obvious and not so obvious reasons.
Obviously, no lawyer, however open he may otherwise be with an outside
observer, wants to reveal himself to be engaged in plainly illegal and im-
moral behavior. Less obviously, all lawyers prefer to avoid illegal and im-
moral conduct if they can help it. They want to be as law-abiding as
possible, in fact as well as in appearance. Moreover, a lawyer generally
does not want to inculpate himself in the eyes of the client. For one thing,
the client might turn him in to the authorities. A risk of lesser conse-
quence but greater likelihood is that inculpation in the eyes of the client
would impair the client's confidence in the lawyer's effectiveness. A client
may suppose that a lawyer whom he sees as a crook will also be seen by
others as a crook, and as such will be accorded less credibility as a spokes-
man. For these reasons, it is not surprising that Dr. Mann did not en-
counter any lawyer directly instructing a client or witness as to what his
testimony should be. Indeed, it is probably infrequent that lawyers actu-
ally do this.
But what cannot be recommended directly may be suggested indirectly.
The chapter in Anatomy of a Murder1 on "the lecture" is the classic
explanation of how this is done. Dr. Mann's findings show that "the lec-
ture" is not fictional:
14. J. VoE.xER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
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The attorney accepts that there are certain things he cannot and
should not do-such as tell a client to alter his story-but if he ex-
plains to a client the legal significance of a particular story, mani-
festly a legitimate form of counsel, it is permissible even if he could
foresee that given the particular client this explanation may result in
client improprieties. While the immediate objective is to prevent the
client from disclosing information to the attorney, the broader objec-
tive is to keep the client from disclosing inculpatory information to
the government. 15
A second means of facilitating the suppression of incriminating evidence
is to suggest to the client or witness what his testimony should not be. The
crucial factual element in many cases does not concern those facts of
which the client has affirmative recollection, but rather those of which he
may lack clear memory. This is particularly true in cases involving mental
states such as intention, awareness, or purpose-elements in virtually all
white-collar crimes. Wouldn't it be convenient if the client could not re-
member such and such a conversation? Or could not recall seeing such
and such a document? Or could not recollect whether or not so and so was
present at a specified meeting? Most white collar defendants can figure
out what is convenient not to remember. The defense lawyer must decide
whether he should, through probing and memory-stimulating questions,
disturb the client's emergent failure to recall.
As the problem was viewed by one of the lawyers:
'... I never ask anybody to tell me anything except what they want
to tell me. I am not interested in fairy tales, and I am certainly inter-
ested in knowing at least what [the clients] have told the investiga-
tors. But I think it is absolutely ridiculous for a lawyer to say I can't
help you unless I know everything. If a fellow wants to conceal
something, that is because if you probe unnecessarily, he is going to
tell you what you don't want to hear and it is going to be devastat-
ing. Most clients, I think, have enough brains not to tell
everything.'16
A third means is to eliminate discrepancies between the client's testi-
mony and that of others. Up to a certain point, this is a standard and
legitimate trial preparation technique. But in any given situation it is
often not clear where that stopping point is. Should the lawyer acquiesce
when the client is invoking ties of kinship or friendship to a witness in
order to eliminate inconsistencies in testimony? Relationships are drawn
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or forget according to the interest of a child caught in the toils of the law?
But what about relationships in a business or corporate setting? As one of
the lawyers in Dr. Mann's study said:
In some cases . . . you can represent a corporation and its presi-
dent. . . . This gave me a great deal of leverage over most of the
managerial staff in the company. They couldn't very well refuse to
interview when their boss was telling them to cooperate.17
The reduction of discrepancy may have been accomplished by a refer-
ring lawyer before the case was placed in the specialist's hands:
The client's corporate counsel . . . has brought the defense attorney
in because he is required to by a court-enforced and ethical doctrine
prohibiting multiple representation of parties whose interests may
diverge significantly. . . It is . . . not unusual that he coaches his
client about what information to disclose to the defense attorney
18
Still another means of effecting the suppression of evidence is to indi-
cate to the client the evidentiary significance of potentially incriminating
documents. This is a particularly delicate matter. Suggesting the destruc-
tion of evidentiary documents is as illegal and unethical as counseling per-
jury. 9 Moreover, in this era in which any piece of paper may have been
photocopied, destruction of documents can be much easier to prove than
perjury. For the same reasons that lawyers do not want to be taken as
counseling perjury, they do not want to be taken as counseling destruction
of documents. The line between opportunity and inhibition is indeed thin.
Dr. Mann summarizes how some lawyers viewed the problem:
The person faced with the tragedy of a criminal prosecution should
not be told by an attorney how to handle the evidence that can lead
to a conviction. As long as the attorney does not involve himself di-
rectly, it is the client's choice . .. o
Another lawyer viewed it is follows:
My job is to keep the client out of jail. Some of my clients have
ended up in jail not because of the crime for which they were being
investigated, but because they lied, or burned documents, or altered
them in the course of the investigation. So I tell them right off the
17. P. 71.
18. P. 49.
19. See Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
20. P. 121.
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bat that if they want to stay out of jail, let me know what's there,
and keep hands off.21
It is viewed yet differently by others:
There are many cases in which one would surmise that documents
summoned from the client existed at the time the summons was is-
sued. My function in this procedure is a very limited one. I, of
course, do not want the client convicted of [an] obstruction of justice
charge, and I do warn him of the dire consequences of such a hap-
pening. But in the end it is the client's choice. I have no doubt that
clients destroy documents. Have I ever "known" of such an occur-
rence? No. But you put two and two together. You couldn't convict
anyone on such circumstantial evidence, but you can draw your own
conclusion.22
A variation on this means of "encouraging" the disappearance of docu-
ments arises when the lawyer has seen the documents or has possession of
them, and a sub poena demands their production. Here, the lawyer can-
not "not know" without himself becoming involved in a legally wrongful
misrepresentation. But the lawyer can "not know" that the document
must be produced. Among the questions presented in such a situation is
whether the description in the sub poena covers the documents. If the
description does cover the documents, then the client has a duty to produce
them; correlatively, the lawyer would be guilty of a professional offense if
he counseled or assisted the client to evade the sub poena. On the other
hand, if the description does not cover the documents, no production need
be made, because response is required only within the terms of the sub
poena. The critical question therefore is the proper interpretation of the
sub poena.
By way of illustration, Dr. Mann describes a sub poena issued by the
Federal Trade Commission in a matter in which the issue was whether
there had been adverse tests of a product made by the client company.
The sub poena called for "all and any records" of "tests or opinions" and
"any other information" related to "product testing" "done by" or "acted
on" by the company. The company's files included reports from an inde-
pendent testing laboratory on the product in question, showing signifi-
cantly adverse results. Counsel nevertheless decided that the response to
the sub poena should be that there were no documents coming within its
terms, based on the following reasoning: The reports had not been "done
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ing laboratory; at the same time, the reports had not been "acted on" by
the company because the company had declined to change its production
practices in the face of the adverse results. Hence, the lawyer responded
that "a diligent search for records had been made" and that "all records
in the possession of the company called for by the sub poena had been
produced."23
In the eyes of the law, of course, there rarely is evidence that these
various opportunities for suppression of evidence have actually been pur-
sued. As Dr. Mann concludes:
There is really no way of knowing what transpires when a client
and attorney conduct secret meetings. The view that I have been able
to offer goes well beyond that which is provided to an official body
that might be able to mete out disciplinary sanctions . ...2
This is the view of the facts that the legal profession has also generally
assumed in its attitude toward the fidelity of lawyers in performance of
the advocate's duty to the court and the law. What cannot be proven at
law does not exist. But these facts exist in reality and in common knowl-
edge, and now, with Dr. Mann's book, in scholarly documentation. Law-
yers know that the suppression of evidence through the techniques re-
vealed by Dr. Mann is not confined to defense of criminal cases.
2" Quite
the contrary, it is common experience within the trial bar that the same
thing is often done in civil cases, and that some lawyers go further by
lying to cover up. As in criminal cases, these occurrences cannot legally be
proved except in rare instances; they simply are facts.
Suppression of evidence is morally obnoxious. It corrupts the due pro-
cess of law and perverts the defense counsel's function.
2" As a contagion it
corrupts the bar, perverts our profession, and subverts the rule of law. It
is no more tolerable in the judicial function than ballot fraud is tolerable
in the legislative function. It is time we stopped mincing words about the
nature of the evil. Dr. Mann's study helps us to that extent.
The next question, of course, is what to do about it. Marvin Frankel
was unable to get much support when he raised that question a few years
ago.217 But maybe the time will come. When the time does come, one thing
will be clear: Lawyers cannot pretend that their duty as advocates to stay
"within the bounds of the law" extends only as far as a violation of that
23. Pp. 153-155.
24. P. 248.
25. See Brazil, Civil Discovery: How Bad Are The Problems? 67 A.B.A. J. 450 (1981) (surveying
attorneys about civil discovery).
26. See Nix v. Whiteside, 54 U.S.L.W. 4194 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1986) (No. 84-1321).
27. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
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duty can be proved in court. For if that were taken as the normative and
evidentiary standard of determining compliance with the advocate's duty,
the lawyer's answerability to the law would be no greater than that of a
white collar criminal. The notion of "officer of the court" must have more
to it than that.
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